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OBSERVATIONS ON SELECTED PROPOSITlLONS 
from 
A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 
Introductory Remarks 
In few instances could the ancient homily "~here is 
nothing new under the sun" apply with greater accuracy than 
when cited in connection with a discourse on the relation 
between popular governments and the societies they govern. 
Admittedly there may be some new methodologies used in the 
examination of these relations, but the propositions which 
result, even the most extravagant of them, appear to have 
historical antecedents. 
Now the prospective reader may legitimately begin to 
wonder: "Why, then, should I read another such investiga-
tion? Is anything new or profound to be expected from it?" 
The author of such an exercise can but sympathize with 
these questions and beg that his impulse to wander in a 
field already trampled barren will likewise receive sympa-
thetic understanding from the reader. Besides being an act 
of redundancy, this inquiry may also be an act of effontry, 
considering the stature of some of those figures who have 
previously turned their attention to many of the same ques-
tions. But a compulsion similar to that which drove most 
of the 18th century Scottish philosophers and theologians 
to write a treatise on "The Origins of Evil"l now spawns 
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another treatise by an observer of politics on the nature 
of the relation between popular government and society. 
It is almost a mandatory exercise for the student of poli-
tics. 
Naturally this exercise cannot presume to be a defin-
itive work on its subject. A far less ambitious task shall 
be assumed here. That task shAll be an evaluation of two 
propositlons made by rrofessor Robert A. Dahl in A Preface 
to Democratic Theory, a collection of his Charles R. Wal-
green Foundation lectures. Professor Dahl's analysis is 
penetrating and compact, and he makes many propositions 
besides those to be examined here. Any comment or criticism 
on these two chosen propositions should not be interpreted 
as leveled against any other of his theses, not against the 
book in general. Certainly it is a mark of high regard for 
a work such as Professor Dahl's for this writer to wish to 
carry the investigation a bit further. 
er Professor Dahl's two propositions which are to be 
questioned, one is expressed in a single statement made by 
him and the other is suggested by the sense of his arguments. 
The former: "To assume that this country has remained demo-
cratic because of its Constitution seems to me an obvious 
reversal of the relation; it is much more plausible to sup-
pose that the Constitution has remained because our society 
is baSically democratic. n2 The second proposition is actu-
ally a more general expression of the first. It is that of 
the many factors whose actions and interactions have a 
direct, positive bearing on democratic government--
factors of individual behavior patterns, social "checks 
) 
and balances," and constitutional arrangements~ 6f the 
three, the first two are far the most crucial. Professor 
Dahl does not present these theses as dogma, and there 1s 
some evidence he himself has modified his opinion on the 
subject.) But detached from this consideration, the propo-
sitions would seem to be of questionable validity when more 
intimately researched. 
One final comment seems appropriate before this writer 
presents his evaluation. Professor Dahl nowhere gives a 
clinical definition of the term "democracy," leaving one to 
assume that he intends a common-sense interpretation of it. 
The term "democracy" today is used in a very general sort 
of way, usually referring to any form of popular government. 
Traditionally, the variances in forms of popular govern-
ment have been indicated by the use of more particular terms, 
such as republican, democratic, parliamentary, or any other 
of the several versions of popular government. According to 
the conventional meanings, republic refers to a government 
of people elected by citizens and constrained by a consti-
tution. Democracy is a government in which the citizens 
directly operate the government, constrained only by the 
principle of majority rule. Parliamentary government is 
that in which the supreme powers of government are vested 
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in a parliament elected by the citizens. Professor Dahl 
puts this qualification on the definition of democracy: 
"Every advocate of democracy of whom I am aware, and every 
friendly definition of it, includes the idea of restraints 
on majorities. n4 
These terms denoting the variances in forms of popular 
government herein will be used in their traditional mean-
ings, and the term "popul&r government" will be used rather 
than "democracy." The exceptions will be when either quot-
ing or paraphrasing a source which does not observe these 
distinctions. 
rlistorical Evi1ence Regarding the Democratic ~ature of 
American Society 
Evaluation of the first proposition--that the longevity 
of our Constitution owes to the democratic nature of our 
society--needs begin by inquiring into the degree to which 
American society has, historically, been democratic ."- . 
Most of the Founders viewed democracy, as then repre-
sented by the state legislatures, with measured contempt 
and as something to be avoided. 5 Far from attempting to 
create a democracy or a democratic society, these men 
assumed their purpose should conform to " ••• the trans-
cendant law of nature and of nature's God, which declares 
that the safety and happiness of society are the objects af 
which all political institutions aim ••.• n6 This statement 
immedia.tely suggests that Professor Dahl is incorrect in 
his belief that the Founders were devoted to "maximizing 
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democracy"7 as an end in itself. Clearly they conceived 
of republican government as a means, not an end. 
Democratic government had critics other than the re-
publicans. Among some of the social influentials, as well 
as part of the middle class, were people with a favorable 
disposition toward monarchy. Of this group, perhaps Alex-
ander Hamilton is best known to us today. During the tur-
bulent years under the Articles of Confederation, overtures 
were made from a private American delegation to Prince Henry 
of Brandenburg (Frederick the Great's brother) inviting him 
to assume the non-existent throne of the young nation. 
George Washington was offered the crown by a loyal and ad-
miring army. Acting with a restraint which certainly would 
baffle many generals or politici8ns, he curtly refused the 
opportunity.8 The famous episode at the end of the Conven-
tion in which Dr. Franklin was asked whether we had a re-
public or a monarchy is surely as significant for what it 
suggests of the public mind as for his guarded and challeng-
ing reply: "A republic, if you can keep it." The question 
implies that people may have been willing to tolerate a 
Convention which, for all they knew, might opt for monarchy. 
At its inception, then, the Constitution appears not to 
have been an inevitable reflection of any particular demo-
cratic impulse in American society. 
Another historical factor which may have a bearing on 
this investigation is that of mass immigration to the 
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United States. No other human immigration has equalled 
that of the 38 million people who came to America between 
1820 and 1930. 9 The popular notion that these people were 
stifled democrats seeking only the blessings of American 
political liberty is probably vastly overstated. Political 
motivations were likely secondary to those of economics. 
Liberal doctrines and constitutional liberties were vague 
abstractions when compared to the grim economic realities 
facing most potential emigrants. Parliaments and courts 
were far away_ "What poor people wanted was freedom from 
10 laws and customs that curbed individual econo~ic enterprise." 
Let us take, for example, the German immigration to 
this country in the 1850's. It is usually described as the 
epitome of an immigration with its roots in political repres-
sion in the homeland. The liberal revolutions of 1848 had 
failed and the downtrodden, miserable, and oppressed sought 
refuge in America, as the theory goes. "But when the facts 
are examined impersonally and collectively, the investigator 
cannot escape the conclusion that the areas of political d1s-
turbance [citie~ d1d not coincide with the areas of ~mi-
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gration frura~." Indeed, this same analysis is true of 
most 19th century immigration to America: "Here it must be 
recalled that most of the political agitation of the century 
was urban, and peasants had little part in the uprisings 
that marked the advance of democracy.n12 
There is little evidence to suggest that many European 
settlers showed any antipathy for monarchy as such. "Most 
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of them retained a genuine affection for the ruling houses 
of their respective countries, and it was by no means ex-
ceptional for them to hang in the living room a print, 
sometimes only a newspaper illustration, of the monarch 
whose allegience they had forsworn."l) This statement, of 
course, does not intimate that these people were actively 
pro-monarchist, but rather that they were probably less 
anti-monarchist than they were pro-democratic. 
We may, by way of consolidating these observations, 
observe with Oscar Handlin that "With few exceptions, immi-
grants were complete strangers to the democratic process. 
In no country where emigration was a considerable phenome-
non did the suffrage extend to those sections of the popu-
lation which departed for America. Even in England, property 
qualifications kept farm and city laborers from voting until 
the Reform Bill of 1867 •••• Even further from self-
government were the depressed subjects of the feudal mon-
archies of eastern Europe. To all, the very techniques of 
14 democracy were foreign." 
The immigration phenomenon was not, it appears, born 
primarily of severe political repression and discontent, 
though such an interpretation must not be altogether ig-
nored. Integration of the immigrant into the American 
political system was, moreover, not a spontaneous explo-
sion of pent-up democratic impulses screaming for expression. 
Often, perhaps too often to suit many current political 
students, this process was accomplished through careful 
cultivation by the notorious political "boss."15 
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There are those who claim that despite the absence of 
"democratic" habit, attitude, or inclination, immigration 
unintentionally promoted the cause of democracy in America. 
The core of this argument stated by Oscar Handlin is that 
immigration was If ••• a substantial factor in preventing 
political parties from acquiring a rigid class or ideo-
logical affiliation, and thus contributed to set one of the 
conditions of American demodracy.,,16 This concept will re-
ceive treatment throughout the paper, so no attempt will be 
made here to give a comprehensive evaluation of its merits. 
One might caution, however, that the United States was an 
established and functioning republican government prior to 
the immigration years of 1820 to 1930. The Constitutional 
changes during this era--13th through 20th Amendments--
could only very remotely be traced to immigration. Perhaps 
here is a situation contrary to that suggested by ~r. Hand-
lin. Far from setting the "conditioDs of American democ-
racy," the conditions had been set in 1787, and it was to 
the conditions of the United States Constitutional system 
that the immigrants adapted. Obviously it cannot be said 
that conditions in 1787 which inflluenced the Constitution 
were affected by events which followed its adoption. 
One may make the criticism that, even if the immi-
grants were not largely the atoms of democracy in the 
model of our romantic folklore, their numbers were suffi-
ciently diluted by the throngs of native "democratic" yeo-
manry as to not radically alter the basic democratic 
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character of our society. lf the question were to be probed, 
the legendary concept of the yeoman democrat would likely 
go the way of that surrounding the immigrants just discussed. 
But should that be the result, there truly would be little 
reason for surprise. Modern statistical evidence indicates 
that even today--in 20th century America where citizens have 
been born into the democratic tradition, nursed on a diet 
of its virtues, trained in its techniques, and constantly 
assured by politicians that they are a great democratic peo-
ple--we are not the stalwart democrats we ought to be. In-
deed, if our fore bearers were democratic yeomen as we imagine 
and a~ ~. we are so often told, this trait appears not to 
be an inheritable one. 
Modern Statistical Evidence Regarding the Democratic 
Nature of American Society 
Modern statistical eVidence reveals a sharp difference 
in the "democratic" responses of citizens depending on 
whether the questions are asked in the abstract or the ab-
stractions are distilled into concrete questions of proce-
dure and practice. Americans tend to give the expected 
"democratic" answers to the former and disappointingly 
human answers to the latter. 
A Prothro and Grigg study in 1960* involving samples 
from a midwestern and a southern community reveals the fol-
lowing: "In the two communities from which our samples 
were drawn, consensus can be said to exist among the voters 
on the basic principles of democracy when they are put in 
*See Appendix, page 34, for Table of statistics. 
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abstract terms."17 The study further reveals that "When 
these broad principles are translated into more specif1c 
18 propositions, however, consensus breaks down completely." 
Prothro and Grigg conclude their research by saying, "Assum-
ing that the United States is a democracy, we cannot say 
without qualification thut consensus on fundamental princi-
ples is a necessary condition for the existence of a democ-
racy."19 
In a later (1964) study by Herbert McCloskey, the re-
suIts are much the same. Consensus, as defined for the 
purposes of this study, is "a level of agreement reaching 
75 percent."20 The findings: In the questions (12) asked 
measuring the electorate's "Response to items expressing 
'Rules of the Game,'" there is no consensus on any of the 
twelve questions. 2l In "Responses to items expressing sup-
port for specific applications of free speech and procedural 
rights," there is consensus on only two of nine questions. 22 
"Responses to items expressing belief in equality" reveal 
no consensus on any of fifteen questions. 23 But, we learn, 
"The picture changes somewhat when we turn from 'Rules of 
the Game' to items which in a broad, general way express 
belief in freedom of speech and opinion."24 On "Responses 
to items expressing support for general statements of free 
speech and opinion," consensus exists on seven of eight 
questions. 25 From his study l-rofessor McCloskey remarks 
that "The electorate displays a substantial measure of unity 
chiefly in its support of freedom in the abstract; on most 
11 
other features of democratic belief and practice it is 
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sharply divided." His final conclusion seems to vary 
little f~orn that of Prothro and Grigg: "Our first and most 
obvious conclusion i~that, contrary to the familiar claim, 
a democratic society can survive despite widespread popu-
lar misunderstanding and disagreement about basic democrat1c 
and constitutional values." 27 McCloskey states that the 
findings from his study " ••• furnish little comfort for 
those who wish to believe that a passion for freedom, toler-
ance, justice, and other democratic values springs spon-
taneously from the lower depths of society ••• "28 One 
might now venture to comment that we are not a great and 
united "democratic" people, but just a great people, or per-
haps even just another people with a good government. 
Naturally these studies are open to significant crit1-
cisms. One feature of both is that some of their evidence--
i.e. that the electorate tends toward consensus on abstract 
democratic principles--appears to be contradicted by their 
conclusions that consensus Or) fundaI"lental democrat1c prln-
ciples 1s not a requ1s1te for democracy. A possible ex-
planation for this inconsistency 1s that the authors assign 
a critical difference in meanings between the words "abstract" 
and "fundamental." Aside from this apparent incongruity, 
a person dissatisfied with the conclusions may always take 
issue with the methodology. One contend1ng the validity of 
the conclusions might question the composition of the 
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sampling, the phrasing of the questions, and the lamentable 
fact that people (even-or especially political students) 
do. not often distinguish between the concepts of tolerance 
and indifference, or liberty and license. However, no one 
who argues the conclusions has yet adduced contrary evi-
dence to support his opposition. With a fair degree of 
certainty, it may be stated that if by "basically democratic" 
Professor Dahl meant a society teeming with individual 
democrats, he was, simply, off target. 
Pluralism and Diversitl As Thel Relate to the 
Q~mocratic Nature of American Society 
One other possible alternative for the definition of 
"democratic society" is that society which is marked by 
diversity among the attitudes and interests of the citizenry, 
or pluralism. The gist of Professor Dahl's chapter on "Poly-
archal Democracy" is to admonish us to direct our fixation 
from the Constitutional separation of powers to the social 
separation of powers.29 These considerations of social 
balance of power were not ignored by the Founders, as wit-
nessed by Madison's The Federalist, No. 10. The question, 
as all--includlng Professor Dahl--will admit, is one of 
degree. 30 
Diversity has been a constant and necessary companion 
to the human condition, in any place and at any time. 
"Sexual recombination imposes diversity on living beings. 
Evaluated by environment, that diversity becomes inequal-
ity.")l A person could just as well list air as a 
13 
prerequisite to p~pular government, for the latter 1s never 
found outside the presence of the former. The Soviet Union, 
despite a blend of nationalities and ethnic groups in a 
number perhaps not duplicated in any other nation-state, 
remains a system believed by many to be something less than 
the apotheosis of popular government. If it be proposed 
that consensus must exist on the basic social goals and 
that diversity must be restricted to means only, the defense 
of diversity as a pre-condition to popular government weakens 
proportional to this restriction on its definition. But 
apparently diversity, in a broad sense, is a feature as com-
mon to dictatorships ~s to democracies. Diversity under-
stood as differentiation surely cannot be said to be a 
parent, or even a midwife, to popular government. 
We can if we wish, and perhaps we should, attach a 
definition to pluralism which would distinguish it from 
diversity. Let us define pluralism as that social condi-
tion in which a number of various interest groups contend 
for power within a framework of agreed norms, and then 
study the claim that this is a social pre-condition for 
democracy. This is not a new theory, and it finds favor 
among many modern political students. The argument has an 
alluring cogency which, if one grants the rationality of 
the human being, becomes nearly irrefutable by rational 
analysis. However, the assumption of rationality may be 
the central defect of the doctrine. Conventionally, this 
argument proposes that the division of society into 
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specialized groups has brought forth an interdependence 
that makes an unwarranted attack on a group an indirect 
attack on oneself. The restraint demanded by this situa-
tion constitutes the social checks and balances. As we 
have become more specialized, we have come closer together. 
"Diversity has made for unity.n32 In times past this 
social condition has been interpreted as a Providential 
design, ft ••• as a means of promoting the universal 
brotherhood of man.")) This is a most seductive argu-
ment for its simple, solid rationality. 
But then we are confronted with the facts of current 
events. The cynical spectator might wonder whether the 
"agreed norms" of interest groups are not poorly camou-
flaged manifestations of might making right. 0ur present 
situation resembles Hobbes' "all against all." That pro-
verbial Martian visitor would find our survival instincts 
strange indeed as he observed our "brotherhood" in action. 
In the industrial, "democratic" societies of the West, he 
would wonder in ama~ement at the disastrous coal strikes 
in Britain, the government employees' strikes in France, 
and the myriad strikes in Italy. Closer home, he would 
marvel at the instinct for the jugular of our own men and 
women in white who have discovered perhaps the ultimate 
weapon of the competition--the sick, the ailing, and the 
dying, who are in a position to offer neither check nor 
34 balance in this pluralistic arrangement. 
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So what is the contribution of this brotherhood to 
popular government? Its role is to introduce a new pre-
cariousness, a new fragility, a new vulnerability to these 
governments. Even in Britain, the Mother of ParlIaments, 
speculation is circulating as to whether this particular 
brand of pluralism may not be the knell of parliamentary 
democracy there. 35 Certainly we must conclude the rela-
tion of pluralism to popular government is at best inde-
term1nate, at worst, inimical. 
The Japanese Experience with Parliamentary Democracy 
An interesting exercise might be to introduce the 
modern Japanese experience into this d1scussion. This 
would provide an excellent test case for the stated hypoth-
esis we are examining. Almost universally historians mark 
the beginning of Japan's modest heritage of liberal polit1cs 
from the "Meiji Restoration" in 1867-68. The traditional 
social system was beginning to modernize, and a period of 
experimentation in forms of government followed the Restora-
tion. During this period, mostly the l870's, some Japanese 
political leaders became acquainted with the liberal western 
tradition of Locke, Mill, Montesquieu, et ale Then in 1889 
the "Meiji Constitution" was adopted. Modeled more along 
the line of the authoritarian Austrian and Prussian sys-
tems, it made few concessions to the doctrine of representa-
tive government. The Meiji Constitution was not intended 
to introduce a democratic political system to Japan, but 
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it did provide an environment in which embryonic demo-
cratic thought could incubate. Until 1932 there were 
periods when the democratic spirits enjoyed more or less 
influence in Japanese politics. 36 But following a period 
of parliamentary democracy marked by corruption and inepti-
tude, the assassination of the Prime Minister in 1932 her-
alded a change of political society in Japan. "It [the 
assassinatio~ marked a reversion to authoritarian and 
militaristic ways that were certainly more in the main-
stream of Japan's political traditions than were the brief 
years of 'liberalism.,n37 
The post-war Constitution which fairly imposed par-
liamentary government on Japan was ft' •• • filled with ideas 
and concepts completely foreign to Japanese history, tra-
dition, and values.,n38 Without the benefit of a liberal 
tradition which western democracies take for granted,39 
"Japan is the first Asian country to develop a strong 
and viable democracy although she had no democratic tradi-
tion. Her system of government and politics was thoroughly 
authoritarian and this was consistent with the social and 
40 political values the Japanese held as good." 
The point of this cursory review of parliamentary 
government in Japan has been to give a modern example in 
which popular government has germinated in other than demo-
cratic soils watered by a long liberal tradition and warmed 
by the nproper" social prerequisites. There are, of course, 
reasons given for the success of parliamentary democracy in 
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Japan besides its promulgation by her conqueror: she 
had lost a war, was in a state of post-war dislocation 
and chaos, had an enlightened occupation, was equipped 
with the basic machinery of a modern state, and in post-
41 
war Japan authoritarianism had been discredited. 
Valid criticism may be advanced against the use of 
the Japanese example. Foremost among them is the fact 
that, despite its success to the present, parliamentary 
governrr~nt cannot yet be considered an established char-
acter1stic of Japan. The modern Japanese experience not 
only casts doubt on Professor Dahl's thesis, but also 
on most other speculat10ns on democratic theory as well. 
But, though it may serve limited purposes, the Japanese 
exa~ple nonetheless has merit as a kind of test case for 
Professor Dahl's proposition. 
Social and Individual Behavioral Requisites 
for a Democratic Order 
'The foregoing has been an attempt to recommend for 
the reader's consideration the idea that American society 
has never been "basically democratic," allowing various 
definitions of the phrase. Yet obviously the Constitution 
has survived, contrary to Professor Dahl's thesis. Further, 
the question has been raised whether such a society, if it 
ever existed, is indeed the sine qua non of democratic gov-
ernment that Professor Dahl supposes it to be. But now 
another interesting propOSition suggested by him requires 
some attention. Hopefully, its intriguing qualities are 
not the result of personal misinterpretation, for this 
proposition, unlike the other, is implied rather than 
explicit. 
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Professor Dahl makes reference to the probable over-
riding importance of personality types and social train-
ing and habits to a successful democracy. By successful 
is meant a non-tyrannical, as well as long-lived, democ-
raC1J. This brand of democracy is perhaps not an alto-
gether common species of the genus, and it is also 
slightly different from the generic democracy which has 
till now been exposited. 
One would be hard put to name a student of popular 
government who was not considerate of some social charac-
teristics and their relation to government. Professor 
Dahl, however, is marked by his emphasis on these factors. 
His chapter on "Folyarchal Democracy" is his attempted ex-
planation of American government in a manner consistent 
with modern thought and evidence. Individual personal 
factors such as legitimate behavior in primary groups, pre-
vailing or modal personality types, conscience, attitudes, 
and basic predispositions are crucial in determining 
whether a society is inclined toward non-tyrannical demoe-
racy.42 The theory of polyarchy focuses on such social 
prerequisites for a democratic order. 4) These social pre-
requisites, we are told, are of capital importance in 
strengthening democracy and H •• • the theory of polyarchy 
suggests that the first and crucial variables to which 
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political scientists must direct their attention are social 
and not constitutional. n44 
The Founders, as Professor Dahl acknowledges, were 
not oblivious to some of these factors. An example of 
this philosophy which almost forecasts Professor Dahl is 
provided by Mr. Pinckney, who says "that a system [Of gov-
ernmen~1 must be suited to the habits and genius of the 
people it is to govern, and must grow out of them."45 
But most of the Founders were unwilling to stake the sur-
vival of their republic on a modulating social structure 
and individual behavior, the latter of which was generally 
dimly viewed by them. 
Indeed, these men today are often either summarily 
dismissed as surly old grumps or politely disdained for 
their unflattering assumptions about human nature. Mr. 
Hamilton assures us that " •• • men are ambitious, vindic-
tive, and rapacious."46 In a similar view Dr. Franklin 
warns that two passions which have a powerful influence 
over the affairs of men are ambition and avarice, love of 
power and love of money.47 Mr. ~~dison observes that "If 
men were angels, no government would be necessary. If 
angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal 
controls on government would be necessary.n48 These state-
ments are presented for the purpose of confirming our com-
mon knowledge of the Founders' axioms on human nature, 
axions which often find little favor among modern political 
students. 
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Professor Dahl is among those who reject these assum-
tions in favor of some more consistent with modern psyco-
logical study. "Polyarchy is a function of the total 
social training in all the norms. n49 Contrast to this 
psychological concept of man as preponderately a product 
of his social training is provided by some relatively recent 
evidence from the natural sciences which indicates that 
human nature 1s far more than the tabula rasa supposed by 
a B. F. Skinner. 
The direction of what is called by some a revolution 
in the natural sciences pOints inexorably to the proposi-
tion that "Man's nature, like his body, is the product of 
evolution. n50 Some of the behavioral characteristics re-
quired by this evolutionary process are not particularly 
of great aesthetic beauty. We are asked to devote some 
thought to the significance of our ape-like ancestor's life 
on the ground in a hostile environment. From such a life, 
primate students now propose, was demanded increased aggres-
siveness and tighter social organization. 5l 
The heralds of the classless state are confident that 
social classes are the product of chronic social pathology. 
Disregarding as they may the appearance of hierarchy in 
all observed societies, whether primitive, pre-industrial, 
or industrial,52 the accumulating evidence of the natural 
sciences indicating that the drive to dominate one's 
fellows may be )00 or 400 million years old 53 must seem 
the most heinous of capitalist conspiracies. Freudians 
, . ..., 
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also have little to cheer about with this new revolution, 
for evidence strongly suggests that "Both territory and 
dominance may be compulsions more powerful than sex. n54 
And these proposals are only the beginning of the modern 
heresy introduced in the natural sciences. Two of the 
greatest subversives of the behavioral school are Konrad 
Lorenz, with his extensive work on ethology, and Raymond 
Dart, who proposes, with a menagerie of corroborating 
fossll evidence, that man evolved from a predatory ape. 55 
Doubts even arise concerning the sanctlty of a human 
property which has been most extravagantly venerated--
that of human conscience. Though James Madison regarded 
it as an inadequate inhibiting force on those passions 
which may threaten the existence of popular government,56 
we recall Professor Dahl's reliance on conscience as a 
necessary social prerequisite to democracy. But such re-
liance is questionable when we consider the conclusions of 
an observer of the revolution in the natural sciences: 
••• conscience as a guiding force in the 
human drama is one of such small reliability 
that it assumes very nearly the role of vil-
lain. Conscience has evolved directly from 
the amity-enmity complex of our primate past. 
But unlike civilization it has acted as no 
force to inhibit the predatory instince. It 
has instead been the conqueror's chief ally. 
And if mankind survives the contemporary pre-
dicament, it will be in spite of, not because 
of, the ~arochial powers of our animal con-
sCience • .57 
If the contribution of human nature to "democracy" has 
been presented as wholly negative, then it might be well to 
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advance a theory somewhat to the contrary. The study of 
the modern German physiologist, Paul Leyhausen, has led him 
to believe that the drive of dominance over a territory 
guarantees the right and liberty of the individual, mak-
ing territorial behavior in man a force for democracy. But 
the increasing density of population promotes absolute hl-
erarchy and presents an incalculable threat to true democ-
racy.58 As a theory, this explanation does not account for 
the relative success of popular government in the densely 
populated Benelux countries, and its conspicuous absence 
from the more sparsely peopled Soviet Umlon or the African 
interior. But as an incompletely examined theory, it may 
have merit worthy of further study. 
A survey of recent developments lmany of which post-
date Professor Dahl's lectures in 1956) in the natural 
sciences tends to justify a favorable re-evaluation of the 
Founders' axioms on human nature as compared to those of 
Professor Dahl. Observing human activity, one finds it 
difficult to share his confidence that our knowledge of 
behavior is sufficient to permit the acceptance of many 
conclusions as to which behavior patterns may be positively 
related. to democracy and those which we have the power to 
alter. When Desmond Morris implies that Adolph Hitler's 
"vast lust for power" may be related to the absence of 
one testicle, as revealed by autopsy,59 one can only wonder 
just how nefarious Hitler would have been had both testicles 
been missing. It simply is mind-boggling to think of thirty 
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million deaths caused possibly in part by the absence of 
one man's testicle. There is, as a matter of subjective 
opinion, a degree of imprecision in the yet youthful 
"psycho" studies adequate to arouse skepticism from those 
~ 
other than the devoted obscurant regarding the application 
of these studies to questions such as those being raised 
by Professor Dahl. 
The evidence from the natural sciences Is not being 
presented here as the final authority as opposed to the 
"psycho" sciences on the matter of human behavior. Future 
developments in these disciplines may eventually see the 
emergence of one of them as undisputed master on the sub-
ject. However, it must be admitted that evidence from 
the natural sciences casts serious doubts on the validity 
of some of our modern behavioral dogma~. and that is the 
reason for its inclusion in this investigation. 
Social Determinism and the Democratic Order 
Thus far historical, statistical, emperical, and some 
"scientific" evidence has been employed in examining the 
two propositions concerning the society-government rela-
tion. These two propositions have been considered separ-
ately, but when considered together they imply a single, 
larger concept which sho~ld be subjected to inspection. 
The concept, if the writer may attempt to affix a name 
to it, may be called the "social determinist" interpreta-
tion of the correlation between society and government--
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the nature of the society is the determinant of its gov-
ernment. Believing such an inference as to his under1y-
ing thesis to be justified by the sense of Professor 
Dahl's arguments, some of which have been quoted herein, 
the writer will direct the final phase of this investiga-
tion toward a few speculative observations concerning 
this general concept. 
One major defect in the social determinist doctrine 
is its refusal to acknowledge the possibility that a gov-
ernment is capable of more than merely reflecting the social 
and personal characteristics of its citizenry. Indeed, 
governments may be among the chief forces in shaping the 
character of social attitudes, construction, and behavior. 
Foremost among these governments are the totalitarian 
regimes, whose energies may be spent largely on preparing 
a reluj~tant society for some irreverent mystic's vision of 
the millenium. At the opposite extreme are those Jacobin 
60 democracies which pander spinelessly, though democrati-
cally, to popular passion and popular will, coming to rest 
on the lowest denominator of the social composition. 61 
Between the extremes, though certainly not in their 
middle, is republican government. This government admon-
ishes its citizens to exercise self-restraint in the prac-
tice of self-government, but it is structured in a manner 
so as to restrain behavior of its citizens in the likely 
event that they momentarily forsake this republican virtue. 
Being devoted more to restraining, rather than to 
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exacerbating, this govern~ent is freed from the mob atmos-
phere sufficiently to allow it to pursue the public interest 
and the general welfare, as opposed to the public, or gen-
eral, ~lill. Men who had witnessed the dangers to liberty 
from the "democratic licentiousness of the State Legisla-
tures,,62 were vividly aware that a successful popular 
government must be so constructed as to function in a 
respectable manner even when the citizens' self-restraint 
was marginal. The attitude is succinctly expressed by Mr. 
Madison: "In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever 
characters composed, passion never fails to wrest the scep-
tre from reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a Socra-
te~, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob."6) 
So there are in these three examples at least that 
many variations on the society-government relation. In 
the totalitarian example we cannot say whether government 
is the product of social factors or, contrarily, whether 
social construction is a result of government policy. The 
concept of social determinism would seem inadequate to de-
scribe this situation. The democracies which aspire to 
nothing higher than servility to the "public will" are per-
haps more amenable to the social determinist explanation. 
But the question of American government, which has been our 
concern, is of a republic, a government to which the social 
determinist doctrine is inapplicable. Republican govern-
ment is purposely more than the sum of its social compo-
nents: "The original republican idea of self government 
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was what we would today call high minded. The self which 
was supposed to govern is necessarily conceived of as be-
ing a better self than the self which naturally exists, 
and the purpose of the republic, in all its aspects, is 
necessarily a self-improving one. n64 To the degree this 
feature of republican government is ignored by Professor 
Dahl, his social determinist explanation of the origin and 
duration of American government is commensurately less 
acceptable. 
The absOlute neglect by Professor Dahl of the contri-
butions to the development resulting from individual human 
discovery, invention, and design is a critical omission. 
Why these considerations are sacrificed in deference to a 
theory that popular government is the denouement of largely 
impersonal forces is a matter of conjecture. A few se-
lected observations on the importance of these elements to 
human affairs may suffice to demonstrate the responsibility 
of any theorist of popular government to make an account of 
them. 
Calling again on the people of the natural sCiences, 
we learn that civilization itself--as opposed to society--
is quite probably a human invention. The invention of 
the long distance weapon, the bow and arrow, was also the 
birth of the human as an individual. With this new de-
velopment the already large brain was liberated from the 
inhibitions previously mandated by the communal hunting 
society.65 "It was the individual who created our 
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civilizations. After millions of years of social re-
pression the individual, released, released the great 
brain.,,66 If the individual is responsible for the cre-
ation of civilization, and government is an element of 
civilization, then clearly political theory cannot over-
look the importance of the individual when contemplating 
the origin of government. More central to our investiga-
tion is one of the signal discoveries of "the great brain" 
so far as students of popular government are concerned--
that is, natural law. 
walter Lippmann was perhaps most prominent among the 
modern political students who assigned to the natural law 
doctrine a central role in the establishment and function-
ing of popular government. Ancient Roman jurists joined 
in a series of speculations which came to constitute a 
general body of thought known as natural law. 67 Lippmann stats$, 
Except on the premises of this philosophy it 
is impossible to reach intelligible and work-
able conceptions of popular election, major-
ity rule, representative assemblies, free 
speech, loyalty, property, corporations, and 
voluntary associations. The founders of 
these institutions, which the recently en-
franchised democracies have inherited, were 
all of them adherents of some ogB of the 
various schools of natural law. 
This concept received constructive treatment by 
influential political thinkers from Aristotle to Aquinas 
to Locke. We may begin to think of popular government as 
something of an elitist concept. Certainly it is diffi-
cult to deny that, tracing them to their historical 
28 
origins, " •• • free institutions and democracy were con-
ceived and established by men who adhered to a public 
philosophy [natural la€l. ,,69 Even V. O. Key, Jr., as-
serts that the vitality of democracy is not in the masses, 
but rather in a "substantial sprinkling of persons through-
out the population concerned with the public weal and 
animated by a faith in the syste,r.,,70 Or, as Walter Lipp-
mann observes, the suffrage on a large scale has generally 
followed, not preceded, the establishment of free institu-
tions: fl •• • the enfranchised masses have not, surpris-
ingly enough, been those who most staunchly defended the 
institutions of freedom."7 1 
Admittedly, the relation between individual human 
initiative and popular government is a fit subject for 
separate treatment. In such a drama natural law would 
appear probably as the protagonist supported by other ma-
jor and minor characters. Attention here has focused on 
the contributions of natural law to the working concept 
of popular government only to demonstrate the insuffici-
ency of any theory of popular government which fails to 
take an account of it. 
Qualifying, Clarifying, and Summarizing Remarks 
Professor Dahl describes his essays as an attempt 
to "raise questions that would need to be answered by a 
satisfactory theory of democratic politics."72 In so 
doing he has conformed to the laudable convention of 
-. 
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constructing arguments based on certain premises which re-
solve into logical conclusions. The efforts of this 
writer's criticism have been directed toward what he thinks 
to be a couple of the primary premises of Professor Dahl. 
One of these premises, hinted at throughout the essays 
and explicitly stated in one passage, maintains that we 
have a democratic government because we have been, and are, 
a democratic people. We allowed several common meanings 
to the term "democratic" and examined the degree to which 
such a term fairly characterizes our society. 
historically, little evidence was found indicating a 
residence of the "democratic spirit" in American society. 
During the formative years of the republic, whatever demo-
cratic characteristics we may wish to believe existed were 
offset by licentious state legislatures and monarchial 
sympathies in certain sections of the population. 
The folklore surrounding the immigration phenomenon 
and its supposed contributions to American democracy were 
found to be more myth than fact. The evidence failed to 
reveal any intense pro-democratic dispositions among the 
immigrants as a group. The suggestion that the immigra-
tion movement somehow set conditions for American democ-
racy is questionable when one considers the fact that 
this movement could hardly have affected extensively an 
event which preceded it. None of the Constitutional 
Amendments of that era could be directly ~trobad to the 
mass immigration movement. Thus it seems legitimate to 
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believe that the immigrants adapted more to the United 
States Constitutional system than vice versa. 
Little more encouraging for those attached to the 
notion of the essentially democratic nature of our soci-
ety was the consideration of some modern statistical data. 
This research failed to confirm any such notion, and the 
researchers themselves hesitated to conclude that such a 
condition was necessarily a prerequisite to democratic 
government. Allowing that a democratic society might be 
synonymous with a society marked by diversity or plural-
ism, this writer attempted a brief discussion of their 
apparent effects on modern governments. The fruits of 
this discussion were inconclusive. Diversity was found 
to be 8. universal condi ti on of human societies, and plur-
alism, particularly as represented by interest group compe-
titlon, could not be identified as either a requisite for 
democracy or its bane. 
'rhe exercise outlining the recent Japanese experience 
was intended to present a modern test case for Professor 
Dahl's statement. This one example was believed to pose 
less problem.atically most of the issues which he.d earlier 
been examined in greater detail and which, like some other 
issues, could not be adequately explained by his hypoth-
esis. If Professor Dahl's hypothesis is true for American 
government but not for the Japanese government, we must 
then conclude it to be a parochial and not a universal 
proposition. 
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The indirect thesis drawn froID Professor Dahl's 
essays revealed a marked emphasis on the importance of 
personal and social habits, such as conscience and modal 
behavior, to a successful democracy. A high reliance was 
placed on the capacity to instruct society in the norms 
requisite for a democracy. This philosophy eschews the 
Bounders' axioms of human nature as largely fixed. For 
these axioms is substituted the idea that we may create 
a de~ocratic government by first constructing democratic 
individuals and society. Rhetorically the question was 
raised as to whether our present knowledge in the "psycho" 
sciences justified such an idea. Inspection of some new 
evidence from the natural sciences indicated that man may 
be every bi t the rascal Some .o:ti:,the. Founders suspected him 
to be. Far from being a behavioral tabula rasa, the human 
being seems to have a rather definite, if limited, biologi-
cal imprint on his behavior patterns. 
After appropriating to the union of Professor Dahl's 
two propositions the term "social determinism," this 
writer's investigation pointed to some probable defects 
of such an explanation of popular government. This par-
ticular determinism is open to the same objections as near-
ly any determinist solution: it fails to acknowledge the 
complexity of cause-effect relationships; i.e. to recog-
nize that society can be affected by its government as 
much as a government may be affected by its society. It 
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also neglects the role of human invention in human affairs--
a serious oversight. 
The recapitulation of these points should indicate 
that serious difficulties arise if a theory of popular gov-
ernment is to begin with two of the premises discussed at 
length here. Probably no theory can be constructed which 
would, for all, answer satisfactorily the tests that ex-
perienc.land curious minds can devise. At least, we have 
had little such success in the last 2500 years or so. 
This inquiry has not necessarily attempted to prove 
anything in a manner acceptable to a logician or a math-
ematician; it could not presume to do so. Aside from con-
tending the two premises of Professor Dahl, this venture 
has by indirection sought to force a re-evaluation of the 
larger question of social determinism. Particularly as 
it might apply to the American Constitutional system, this 
doctrine would seem inadequate. Certainly the Founders 
did not ignore social factors when setting about to con-
struct a new government, but neither did they see them-
selves as mere instruments of forces beyond their control. 
The conflict between determinist and non-determinist phil-
osophies finds insuperable expression by Alexander Hamil-
ton: 
It has been frequently remarked, that it 
seems to have been reserved to the people 
of this country, by their conduct and example, 
to decide the important question, whether so-
cieties of men are really capable or not, of 
establishing good government from reflection 
and choice, or whether they are forever des-
tined to depend, for their pol?tical consti-
tution, on accident and force. 3 
Obviously Hamilton thought that men need not depend on 
forces beyond their control for their political consti-
tution. He could have been wrong. But if so, we must 
admit that rarely has so enduring ,and honorable a docu-
ment as the Constitution of the United States been con-




The following table was compiled by Prothro and 
Grigg in "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases 
of Agreement and Disagreement," Journal of Politics, 
XXII, No. 21 (May 1960), p. 285. 
-rAUl. 1-: 1 
PJo:RCI'SL\"L "I' "j >, \ T 1('" RESPONS LS TO B,\SIC' PRI"1C'IPLES OF' DEMOCRACY 
;\ : ,.,,~ Sr:LECTED POPUL\TION GROI"PS 
34 
EOtTATIOst A."'N TALL.\- Isco.:.rr.t 
TOTAL Hil!"h Low 
~=244 N=137 N=I06 
MAJORITY RrLE 
1. Only informed vote* 49.0 61.7 34.7 
2. Only tax-payers vote* 21.0 22.7 18.6 
3. Bar Negro from office" 80.6 89.7 68.6 
4. Bar O>mmunist from office* 46.3 56.1 34.0 
5. AMA right to bloc voting** 45.0 49.6 39.2 
MINORITY RIGHTS 
6. Allow anti-religious speech·* 63.0 77.4 46.5 
7. Allow socialist speech*'" 79.4 90.2 65.7 
8. Allow Communist speech** 44.0 62.9 23.5 
9. Bar Negro from candidacy* 75.5 86.5 60.2 
10. Bar Communist from candidacy· 41.7 48.1 30.3 
• For these statements, disagreement is recorded as the "democratic'" response . 
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